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Monetary and Fiscal Policy under Deep Habits1
Campbell Leith2 Ioana Moldovan3 Raﬀaele Rossi4
1. Introduction
Deep habits (see Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2006 and 2012), which occur at
the level of the individual goods, rather than total household consumption, can improve
the empirical performance of standard DSGE models in various dimensions. Aside from
replicating the hump-shaped response of key variables to monetary policy shocks and
adding inertial behavior more generally (as do other forms of habits), they also imply,
consistently with the data, countercyclical markups and the crowding in of private sector
consumption following increases in government spending. The latter property raises the
government spending multiplier from well below one in the benchmark New Keynesian
model, to above one.5,6 The intertemporal nature of the pricing problem for ﬁrms,
which face a dynamic demand curve as a result of deep habits, further implies that
the transmission mechanism of monetary policy is altered too, with monetary policy
aﬀecting pricing decisions directly. Finally, deep habits, which are of an external type,
imply that the distortions present in the modelled economy, which eﬀectively deﬁne the
trade-oﬀs facing the policy maker, are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from those typically found in
New Keynesian models. In this paper, we explore the implications for optimal monetary
and ﬁscal stabilization policy of introducing this new distortion to policy making and
the implied fundamental changes in the macroeconomic response to shocks. We now
turn to motivate our exploration of the policy problem under deep habits more fully,
before outlining the key results and plan of the rest of the paper.
5An alternative, commonly used extension to the benchmark model which is designed to achieve the
crowding in of private consumption is to assume a proportion of households only consume out of current
income and neither borrow nor save - see (Gali, Lopez-Salido, and Valles, 2007) and (Bilbiie, 2009). We
prefer to use the deep habits device for both theoretical and empirical reasons. While the assumption
that some households are credit constrained may be justiﬁable, precluding the possibility of saving seems
less so. Moreover, (Colciago, 2011) argues that the mechanism through which the crowding in occurs
and the number of households that must be hand-to-mouth consumers for the crowding in eﬀect to be
achieved are not consistent with the data.
6Recent work looking at optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy in sticky-price New Keynesian models
(see, for example, (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2004a) and (Benigno and Woodford, 2003)) typically ﬁnds
that ﬁscal policy should be largely devoted to ensuring ﬁscal solvency, while monetary policy plays a
demand management role. However, such models contain the usual crowding out eﬀects from public
consumption such that the eﬃcacy of ﬁscal policy as a stabilization device may be thought to necessarily
be limited.
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Literature on Deep Habits
Empirical evidence generally ﬁnds that output, consumption and real wages increase
in response to an unexpected increase in government spending, see inter alia (Fatas and
Mihov, 2001), (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002), (Gali, Lopez-Salido, and Valles, 2007),
(Zubairy, 2010b), (Zubairy, 2010c), and (Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe, 2012). Con-
trary to this evidence, standard Real-Business Cycle models, for example (Baxter and
King, 1993), and New Keynesian models, such as (Fatas and Mihov, 2001), ﬁnd instead
a crowding out eﬀect: private consumption falls after a positive government spending
shock. This result comes from the fact that after a government spending shock house-
holds face a negative wealth eﬀect and inevitably lower their consumption and increase
hours worked. The increase in labor supply also causes real wages to fall, another result
at odds with the empirical evidence.
(Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe, 2006) show that the crowding in eﬀect of public
spending on private consumption can be induced in a standard RBC model where ﬁrms
have some monopolistic power and agents’ preferences contain deep habits in consump-
tion of individual goods. Deep habits imply a downward-sloping demand function that
depends on the lagged level of consumers’ purchases of that speciﬁc good. Since ﬁrms
take this demand function as a constraint in their optimal price-setting problem, deep
habits have pronounced implications for aggregate supply. In particular, the inelastic
part of the demand function due to the impact of consumers’ past purchases of a spe-
ciﬁc good, implies that, ceteris paribus, an increase in demand for the good, generates
an incentive for ﬁrms to lower markups. Hence, deep habits can successfully mimic
the countercyclicality of ﬁrms’ markups generally found in the data. Accordingly, an
increase in government spending, which raises aggregate demand, leads to a decline in
ﬁrms’ markups. This shifts the labor demand curve outward, increasing real wages. In
turn, the rise in wages induces households to substitute consumption for leisure. At plau-
sible estimates of the degree of deep habits, this substitution eﬀect may be strong enough
to oﬀset the negative wealth eﬀect coming from the increase in public consumption, re-
sulting in an equilibrium increase in private consumption, see Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2006, 2012) and (Zubairy, 2010b). When considering deep habits in an open
economy context, Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012) ﬁnd that a two-country RBC
model augmented with deep habits can not only provide a rationale for the counter-
cyclical markup and increase in private consumption, but also for an initial depreciation
in the real exchange rate following a government spending shock, a feature consistent
with the empirical evidence. Moreover, deep habits share with their superﬁcial counter-
part7 the same aggregate demand behavior, such that models featuring deep habits still
retain the empirically desirable hump-shaped response of key aggregate variables after
7Superﬁcial habits refer to habits that are formed at the level of the household’s consumption basket,
rather than at the level of individual items in the basket.
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a monetary shock, see (Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, Uribe, and Uuskula, 2010) and (Leith,
Moldovan, and Rossi, 2012).
Given that deep habits imply empirically appealing impulse responses to key macroe-
conomic shocks, it is not surprising that estimation of models with deep habits are
typically preferred to their superﬁcial counterparts. Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, Uribe and
Uuskula (2010) introduce deep habits into a standard medium scale sticky-price/ sticky-
wage model and estimate the key parameters using a limited information approach.
They ﬁnd that the model with deep habits provides a superior ﬁt to the identiﬁed dy-
namic eﬀects of monetary policy shocks compared with superﬁcial habits. Moreover,
the model with deep habits can account simultaneously for the persistent impact of
monetary policy shocks on consumption, for the price puzzle, and inﬂation persistence.
Similar evidence in favor of deep habits is found by Zubairy (2010a, 2010b). (Lubik and
Teo, 2011) derive and estimate a New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) in a model with
deep habits and show that such habits alter the NKPC in a fundamental manner as it
introduces expected and contemporaneous consumption growth, as well as the expected
marginal value of future demand, as additional driving forces for inﬂation dynamics.
Estimating the structural parameters of the model using a GMM technique, they ﬁnd
that the ﬁt of the deep habits NKPC is much improved over the standard NKPC.
Motivation and Plan
Aside from potentially raising the eﬃcacy of government spending policy, as sug-
gested by the evidence discussed above, the modelling of deep habits has further impor-
tant implications for policy. Firstly, ﬁrms’ current pricing decisions aﬀect the stock of
habits possessed by their customers and therefore future levels of demand for the good
they produce. This intertemporal aspect to pricing decisions, on top of that implied by
nominal inertia, means that monetary policy will have a direct eﬀect on ﬁrms’ pricing
decisions and hence inﬂation. Secondly, the habits externality, whereby households do
not take account of the impact of their consumption decisions on the welfare of others,
implies that there is an additional distortion in the economy beyond those associated
with monopolistic competition and nominal inertia. For standard estimates of the ex-
tent of habits formation, this distortion will dominate to such an extent that it implies a
highly distorted economy, as in (Levine, Pearlman, and Pierse, 2008). As a result, in an
economy with deep habits, there is a potential role for ﬁscal stabilization policy, using
government spending and/or tax instruments, alongside monetary policy, as we have
moved a long-way from the special case implied by approximating an economy around
an eﬃcient steady-state.
The current paper explores the robustness of the crowding in result in the context of
a New Keynesian model of optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy, where households possess
deep habits in consumption. We also explore the ability of ﬁscal and monetary policy
instruments to contribute to macroeconomic and ﬁscal stabilization in such an economy.
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To this end, we construct a sticky-price New Keynesian economy along the lines of (Be-
nigno and Woodford, 2003), where households provide labor to imperfectly competitive
ﬁrms who are subject to price adjustment costs. As in (Benigno and Woodford, 2003),
taxes are distortionary. We begin exploring the ﬁscal policy transmission mechanism
by varying the relative extent of habits in private and public goods consumption and
by allowing ﬁrms to discriminate between pricing for private and public goods. In light
of these results, we then assess the ability of ﬁscal policy to stabilize an economy with
price-stickiness, monopolistic competition and deep habits in private and public con-
sumption. In doing so, unlike (Benigno and Woodford, 2003), we also allow government
spending to be used as a policy instrument, rather than treating it as an exogenous
stream which needs to be ﬁnanced.
In the next section, we describe our model. Section 3 then examines the ﬁscal policy
transmission mechanism, before we explore optimal stabilization policy. We ﬁnd that,
government spending shocks can lead to a substantial crowding-in of private sector
consumption in the short-run. However, despite the fact that government spending
multipliers are now greater than one and that our benchmark calibration implies a
large consumption externality as a result of the deep habits, when we turn to augment
optimal monetary policy with the government spending instrument, we ﬁnd that this
instrument actually adds very little to stabilization policy in our model economy. The
public consumption gap (the diﬀerence between the actual variable and the value that
would be chosen by a benevolent social planner) is several orders of magnitude smaller
than the corresponding consumption and output gaps. Moreover, it barely moves in
response to either technology or mark-up shocks.8 Nevertheless, the optimal monetary
policy response to technology and mark-up shocks can be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in the
presence of deep habits, often resulting in a monetary policy stance which is the opposite
of that without such habits eﬀects.
Further enriching the policy problem to include government debt and consider dis-
tortionary taxation to be a policy instrument, we ﬁnd that it remains optimal to allow
steady-state government debt to follow a random walk.9 At the same, time monetary
policy essentially acts to stabilize the consumption gap in the face of technology shocks
and tax policy deals with the mark-up shocks and the consumption externality, without
generating signiﬁcant inﬂation beyond the initial periods of the shock in either case.
Therefore, although government spending contributes little to macroeconomic stabiliza-
tion, tax policy is very useful in oﬀsetting the consumption externality.
8Note that the fact that the government spending gap does not move does not mean that govern-
ment spending itself is not varied in response to shocks. In the case of positive technology shocks the
social planner would choose to expand both public and private consumption, after correcting for the
consumption externalities implied by habits. Therefore maintaining the public consumption gap in the
face of such a shock implies that public consumption would increase.
9As in, for example, (Benigno and Woodford, 2003), (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2004a), and (Leith
and Wren-Lewis, 2013).
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Finally, we assess the ability of a set of simple policy rules to mimic the fully-
optimal Ramsey policy. In an Appendix, we consider the determinacy properties of these
rules and ﬁnd that the usual classiﬁcation of the determinate active and passive policy
rules due to (Leeper, 1991) depends upon the extent of deep habits formation present.
Our analysis shows that the combination of optimized simple, but inertial, monetary
policy rules which respond to inﬂation and tax rules which respond to government debt
can eﬀectively achieve the level of welfare found under the Ramsey plan. However,
the optimal coeﬃcients of these rules are radically diﬀerent whether or not the model
includes habits eﬀects, with a substantial fall in the monetary policy response to inﬂation
and an associated rise in the response of taxation to government debt, when habits
are present. This combination of interest rate and tax policy successfully manages
the unwinding of the stock of habits following shocks, without generating signiﬁcant
inﬂation.
Sensitivity analysis indicates that the main results are generally robust to variations
in the degree of labor supply elasticity and nominal inertia. The ﬁnal section concludes.
2. The Model
The economy consists of households, a monopolistically competitive production sec-
tor, and the government. Households derive utility from consumption of both private
and public goods and they form external consumption habits at the level of the individ-
ual (private/public) goods in their baskets - (Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe, 2006)
call this type of habits ‘deep’. Furthermore, ﬁrms are subject to nominal inertia in
the form of price adjustment costs and they may price discriminate between sales to
households or the government.
2.1. Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of households, indexed by k and of mea-
sure 1. Households derive utility from consumption of composite private and public
goods and disutility from hours spent working.
Deep Habits. When habits are of the deep kind, each household’s private consumption
basket, Xkt , is an aggregate of a continuum of habit-adjusted goods, indexed by i and
of measure 1,
Xkt =
(∫ 1
0
(
Ckit − θCit−1
) ηt−1
ηt di
) ηt
ηt−1
,
where Ckit is household k’s consumption of good i and Cit ≡
∫ 1
0 C
k
itdk denotes the cross-
sectional average consumption of this good. ηt is the time-varying elasticity of substi-
tution between habit-adjusted varieties, assumed to follow a stationary AR(1) process,
as in (Ireland, 2004): ln ηt =
(
1− ρη
)
ln η + ρη ln ηt−1 + 
η
t , with persistence parameter
ρη ∈ (0, 1) and random shocks ηt ∼ iidN
(
0, σ2η
)
. The parameter θ measures the degree
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of external habit formation in consumption of each individual private good i. Setting
θ to 0 returns us to the usual case of no habits in private consumption.
The composition of the consumption basket is chosen in order to minimize expendi-
tures, and the resultant demand is
Ckit =
(
PCit
PCt
)−ηt
Xkt + θCit−1, ∀i
where PCt represents the overall price index (or CPI), deﬁned as an average of prices
of private goods, PCt ≡
(∫ 1
0
(
PCit
)1−ηt di)1/(1−ηt). Aggregating across households yields
the total private consumption demand for good i, i ∈ [0, 1] ,
Cit =
(
PCit
PCt
)−ηt
Xt + θCit−1. (1)
Due to the presence of habits, this demand is dynamic in nature, as it depends not only
on current period elements but also on the lagged value of consumption. This, in turn,
will make the pricing/output decisions of the ﬁrms producing these goods, intertemporal.
Remainder of the Household’s Problem. For the remainder of the households’ problem,
households choose the habit-adjusted private consumption aggregate, Xkt , hours worked,
Nkt , and the portfolio allocation, D
k
t+1, to maximize expected lifetime utility,
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
⎡⎢⎣(Xkt )1−σ
1− σ −
(
Nkt
)1+υ
1 + υ
+ χG
(
XG,kt
)1−σ
1− σ
⎤⎥⎦
subject to the budget constraint,∫ 1
0
PCit C
k
itdi+ EtQt,t+1D
k
t+1 = (1− τ t)WtNkt +Dkt +Φt (2)
and the usual transversality condition. Et is the mathematical expectation conditional
on information available at time t, β is the discount factor (0 < β < 1) , χG the rela-
tive weight on utility from consumption of public goods, and σ and υ are the inverses of
the intertemporal elasticities of habit-adjusted consumption and work (σ, υ > 0; σ = 1).
The household’s period-t income includes: after-tax wage income from providing labor
services (1− τ t)WtNkt , dividends Φt, and payments on the portfolio of assets Dkt . Fi-
nancial markets are complete and Qt,t+1 is the one-period stochastic discount factor for
nominal payoﬀs. τ t is the labor income tax rate. In the maximization problem, house-
holds take as given the processes for Ct−1, Wt, Φt, and τ t, as well as the initial asset
position Dk−1.
The ﬁrst order conditions for labor and habit-adjusted consumption are:(
Nkt
)υ(
Xkt
)−σ = (1− τ t)wt
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and
Qt,t+1 = β
(
Xkt+1
Xkt
)−σ
PCt
PCt+1
,
where wt ≡ WtPCt is the real wage. The Euler equation for consumption can be written as
1 = βEt
[(
Xkt+1
Xkt
)−σ
PCt
PCt+1
]
Rt,
where R−1t = Et [Qt,t+1] denotes the inverse of the risk-free gross nominal interest rate
between periods t and t+ 1, while πCt ≡ PCt /PCt−1 is inﬂation.
2.2. The Government
Deep Habits We follow the literature ((Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe, 2006),
(Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe, 2007)) and allow for deep habits eﬀects in public
consumption, but will assess how optimal policy varies as we alter the extent of such
externalities, including the special case where there are no habits eﬀects in government
spending.
As with the consumption habits in private consumption, the government purchases
individual goods so as to maximize the aggregate XGt that enters the representative
household’s utility function, given the allocated level of aggregate spending, Git−1, from
the previous period,
max
{Gkit}i
XGt =
(∫ 1
0
(
Git − θGGit−1
) ηt−1
ηt di
) ηt
ηt−1
s.t.
∫ 1
0
PGit G
k
itdi ≤ PGt Gkt .
That is, the government does not internalize the impact of its expenditure decisions on
household habit formation over publicly funded consumption when deciding how much of
an individual good to purchase. Since ﬁrms could potentially discriminate between sales
to the private and the public sectors, we allow for a distinct set of public purchased goods
prices,
{
PGit
}
i
, and a corresponding price index, PGt .
10 θG gives a measure of the level
of habits formation in the consumption of public goods. In the maximization problem,
the government takes as given the past consumption of individual public goods, as it
respects the habits formation behavior of households. The demand for public goods i,
i ∈ [0, 1] , is
Git =
(
PGit
PGt
)−ηt
XGt + θ
GGit−1, (3)
10(Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe, 2006) and the rest of the literature on deep habits assume that
there is no price discrimination between private and public customers.
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where PGt =
(∫ 1
0
(
PGit
)1−ηt di) 11−ηt .
Government Budget Constraint Combining the series of the representative
consumer’s ﬂow budget constraints, (2), with borrowing constraints that rule out Ponzi
schemes, gives the intertemporal budget constraint (see (Woodford, 2003), chapter 2,
page 69),
∞∑
T=t
Et[PTCT ] ≤ Dt +
∞∑
T=t
Et[Qt,T (ΦT +WTNT (1− τT ))].
Noting the equivalence between factor incomes and national output,
PCt Y
C
t + P
G
t Y
G
t = WtNt +ΦT ,
and the deﬁnition of aggregate demand, we can rewrite the private sector’s budget
constraint as,
Dt = −
∞∑
T=t
Et[Qt,T (P
G
T GT −WTNT τT )]
which implies that some combination of monetary accommodation, distortionary taxa-
tion and spending adjustments is required to service government debt as well as stabilize
the economy.11 Noting that, in aggregate, the households’ net portfolio consists of gov-
ernment bonds Dt = Rt−1Bt−1 allows us to write the ﬂow budget constraint as,
Bt = Rt−1Bt−1 + PGt Gt − τ tWtNt (4)
or in real terms,
bt = Rt−1
(
πCt
)−1
bt−1 + ζtGt − τ twtNt
where bt ≡ Bt/PCt is real value of debt and ζt ≡ PGt /PCt is the relative price of public
goods in terms of private goods (ζt = 1 when ﬁrms charge the same price to both
households and the government).
2.3. Firms
Goods are produced by a continuum of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms (indexed
by i and of measure 1), which are subject to nominal inertia in the form of quadratic
price adjustment costs, as in (Rotemberg, 1982). Firms may also diﬀerentiate their
output/pricing decisions according to the sector they are supplying, either private or
public.
Each ﬁrm i produces a unique good using only labor as input in the production
11In sections 3.1 and 3.2 below, we temporarily abstract from the ﬁscal ﬁnancing needs of the gov-
ernment by allowing access to lump-sum taxation. We do so in order to explore the implications of
removing government debt from the policy problem, before excluding lump-sum taxes and returning to
the more realistic case where all taxes are distortionary.
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process
Y Fit = AtN
F
it , (5)
with F = {C,G} denoting the speciﬁc sector goods are supplied to. Total factor
productivity, At, aﬀects all ﬁrms symmetrically and follows an exogenous stationary
process, lnAt = ρA lnAt−1 + At , with persistence parameter ρA ∈ (0, 1) and random
shocks At ∼ iidN
(
0, σ2A
)
.
The nominal proﬁts from sales to the private sector are given as
ΦCit ≡ PCit Y Cit −WtNCit −
ϕ
2
(
PCit
πCPCit−1
− 1
)2
PCt Y
C
t
while those from sales to the public sector are
ΦGit ≡ PGit Y Git −WtNGit −
ϕ
2
(
PGit
πGPGit−1
− 1
)2
PGt Y
G
t
where the last term in each expression represents the nominal costs of price adjustment.
Note that we distinguish between the prices charged for public goods and private goods
to allow ﬁrms to price discriminate between the two sectors. We also consider what
happens when such price discrimination is not possible.
We let Z
F(i)
t denote the price adjustment costs of ﬁrm i (in real terms) when sup-
plying goods to sector F = {C,G},
Z
F(i)
t ≡
ϕ
2
(
PFit
πPFit−1
− 1
)2
Y Ft
and we assume that these adjustment costs are expressed in terms of a CES aggre-
gate of the diﬀerentiated goods but which does not feature habits12 (here we index the
diﬀerentiated ﬁrms/goods by j to avoid confusion when aggregating),
Z
F(i)
t =
(∫ 1
0
(
Z
F(i)
jt
) ηt−1
ηt dj
) ηt
ηt−1
(6)
For any given level of Z
F(i)
t , the demand for individual varieties j must be such that
total expenditures
∫ 1
0 P
F
jtZ
F(i)
jt dj are minimized, subject to the constraint (6). This then
yields the individual demand
Z
F(i)
jt =
(
PFjt
PFt
)−ηt
Z
F(i)
t
12While it seems natural to allow for habits formation by households in the consumption of private
and public goods, a similar assumption does not appear particularly plausible when applied to ﬁrms.
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where PFt =
(∫ 1
0
(
PFjt
)1−ηt
dj
) 1
1−ηt
is the price index and the associated total expenses
are
∫ 1
0 P
F
jtZ
F(i)
jt dj = P
F
t Z
F(i)
t . Aggregating across all ﬁrms, the demand for each diﬀer-
entiated good j associated with the price adjustment costs is
ZFjt =
(
PFjt
PFt
)−ηt
ZFt (7)
where ZFjt ≡
∫ 1
0 Z
F(i)
jt di and Z
F
t ≡
∫ 1
0 Z
F(i)
t di.
Proﬁt maximization: In providing goods to households or to the government,
ﬁrms choose PFit , Fit, ZFit , and NFit for F = {C,G} to maximize the present discounted
value of proﬁts, Et
∞∑
s=0
Qt,t+sΦ
F
it+s, subject to the dynamic demand constraints (1) or
(3), the constraint in (7), the production technology (5), and under the restriction that
all demand be satisﬁed at the chosen price, Fit + ZFit = Y Fit . Qt,t+s is the s-step ahead
stochastic discount factor for nominal payoﬀs
(
Qt,t+s = β
t+s uX,t+s
uX,t
PCt
PCt+s
)
. The associated
ﬁrst order conditions are:
vit =
(
PCit −MCt
)
+ θEt [Qt,t+1vit+1]
vGit =
(
PGit −MCt
)
+ θGEt
[
Qt,t+1v
G
it+1
]
Y Cit = ηt
(
PCit
PCt
)−ηt−1 (
PCt
)−1 [(
PCit −MCt
)
ZCt + vitXt
]
+ϕ
(
PCit
πCPCit−1
− 1
)
PCt Y
C
t
πCPCit−1
− ϕEt
[
Qt,t+1
(
PCit+1
πCPCit
− 1
)
PCit+1
πC
(
PCit
)2PCt+1Y Ct+1
]
and
Y Git = ηt
(
PGit
PGt
)−ηt−1 (
PGt
)−1 [(
PGit −MCt
)
ZGt + v
G
itX
G
t
]
+ϕ
(
PGit
πGPGit−1
− 1
)
PGt Y
G
t
πGPGit−1
− ϕEt
[
Qt,t+1
(
PGit+1
πGPGit
− 1
)
PGit+1
πG
(
PGit
)2PGt+1Y Gt+1
]
where MCt =
Wt
At
represents the nominal marginal cost of production, while vit and
vGit are the Lagrange multipliers on the dynamic demand constraints and represent the
shadow prices of producing private and public good i, respectively. These shadow values
equal the marginal beneﬁt of additional proﬁts from each type of good, PCit −MCt and
PGit −MCt, respectively, plus the discounted expected payoﬀs from higher future sales,
θEt [Qt,t+1vit+1] and θ
GEt
[
Qt,t+1v
G
it+1
]
. In the presence of deep habits in consumption,
increasing sales to the private (public) sector leads to an increase in sales of θ (θG) in
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the next period. The other ﬁrst order conditions indicate that an increase in price PCit
(PGit ) brings additional revenues of Y
C
it (Y
G
it ), while simultaneously causing a decline in
demand and aﬀecting price adjustment costs.
In contrast, if we do not allow producers to discriminate between private and public
sales of their products, then the ﬁrst order conditions reduce to,
vit =
(
PCit −MCt
)
+ θEt [Qt,t+1vit+1]
vGit =
(
PGit −MCt
)
+ θGEt
[
Qt,t+1v
G
it+1
]
and
Yit = ηt
(
PCit
PCt
)−ηt−1 (
PCt
)−1 [(
PCit −MCt
)
Zt + vitXt + v
G
itX
G
t
]
+ϕ
(
PCit
πCPCit−1
− 1
)
1
πCPCit−1
PCt Yt − ϕEtQt,t+1
(
PCit+1
πCPCit
− 1
)
PCit+1
πC
(
PCit
)2PCt+1Yt+1
with the additional constraint that PGit = P
C
it . The combined ﬁrst order condition
indicates that the common price should be increased until the extra revenue generated
by selling to both sectors, Yit = Y
C
it + Y
G
it , matches the value of the decline in demand
and the changes in price adjustment costs.
2.4. Equilibrium
All households and ﬁrms in this economy are symmetric. The production of private
and public goods amounts to Y Ct = AtN
C
t and Y
G
t = AtN
G
t , which can be aggregated
to an economy-wide level of output
Yt ≡ Y Ct + Y Gt = AtNt (8)
where Nt = N
C
t +N
G
t represents aggregate labor.
The markets for private and public goods must clear, so we have
Ct +
ϕ
2
(
πCt
πC
− 1
)2
Y Ct = Y
C
t (9)
Gt +
ϕ
2
(
πGt
πG
− 1
)2
Y Gt = Y
G
t (10)
which reduces to the usual aggregate resource constraint, when ﬁrms do not price dis-
criminate between sales to households and the government,
Ct +Gt +
ϕ
2
(
πCt
πC
− 1
)2
Yt = Yt (11)
Note that we generally have two measures of aggregate prices - the usual consumer
price index PCt and the index of the prices of goods supplied to the government P
G
t -
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and consequently two measures of inﬂation, πCt ≡ P
C
t
PCt−1
and πGt ≡ P
G
t
PGt−1
. There are also
two markups of price over marginal cost associated with sales to the private and public
sector, μCt ≡ P
C
t
MCt
and μGt ≡ P
G
t
MCt
, where μCt is the inverse of the real marginal cost.
The symmetric equilibrium is characterized by equations (8) - (11), together with the
government budget constraint and the equilibrium conditions deﬁning the households’
and the ﬁrms’ behavior (Appendix Appendix A.3 lists the entire set of equilibrium
conditions), to which we add the monetary and ﬁscal policy speciﬁcation (as detailed in
Sections 3 and 4 below).
2.5. Solution Method and Model Calibration
Since we are ultimately interested in assessing the welfare beneﬁts of allowing ﬁscal
policy to contribute to the stabilization of our New Keynesian economy featuring deep
habits, we cannot rely on linear approximations to our model’s equilibrium conditions
when evaluating optimal policy. (Kim and Kim, 2003) have shown that such approxi-
mations can give rise to spurious welfare rankings amongst alternative policies. Instead,
we employ the perturbation methods of (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2004b) to obtain
a second-order accurate solution to the model which can be used to validly rank the
welfare consequences of alternative policies.
In order to solve the model, we must select numerical values for some key structural
parameters. Table 1 reports our choices. The bulk of our benchmark calibration comes
from the estimation/calibration of (Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe, 2006). The model
is calibrated to a quarterly frequency and, following (Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe,
2006), we assume an annual real rate of interest of 4%, which implies a discount factor
β of 0.9902. From the same source, the risk aversion parameter σ is set at 2.0 and υ
(the inverse of the Frisch labor supply elasticity) is equal to 1/1.3.13 The Rotemberg
price adjustment parameter, ϕ = 26.34, is chosen to match the Calvo no-price change
probability of 0.6 from (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2006) (which in turn is consistent
with an average price contract length of 7.5 months), given the reduced-form equivalence
between the two forms of nominal-inertia to a ﬁrst-order approximation. Finally, our
habits formation parameter, θ = 0.86, is taken from the central estimate in (Ravn,
Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe, 2006) and we assume a similar benchmark for the habits in
public consumption, θG. These values fall within the range of estimates identiﬁed in the
literature.14
The remaining parameters are calibrated as follows. The weight attached to public
consumption in utility, χG, is 0.143, such that the steady state under the Ramsey plan
implies a government spending to GDP ratio of 0.2, consistent with the U.S. data average
13Estimates of this elasticity vary quite widely and Section 5 below considers a sensitivity analysis
with respect to this parameter.
14Macro-based estimates of habits formation of the deep kind range from relatively lower values of
0.53, as in (Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe, 2012), to very high values of 0.95-0.97, as reported by
(Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe, 2006), (Lubik and Teo, 2011), and (Zubairy, 2010c).
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between 1947 and 2004. We set steady-state government consumption to be in line with
the same level, when we assume Gt follows an exogenous process, rather than lying in
the set of optimal policy instruments. The elasticity of substitution parameter η is set
to 8.128, which implies a steady-state markup of 15%, as a central calibration relative
to the typical values in the literature, which range from 10-20%. We further assume a
steady state government debt to GDP ratio that corresponds to an annual average of
55%, again based on U.S. data from 1947 to 2004. Under the optimal Ramsey policy,
the implicit steady state tax rate takes an empirically plausible value of 0.36 under no
habits and 0.25 under the benchmark calibration of habits, reﬂecting primarily the ﬁscal
ﬁnancing role of taxes.15 Technology shocks are assumed persistent with persistence
parameter ρA = 0.8556 and standard deviation σA = 0.006. These values are taken
from (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2006), who estimate the process jointly with a Taylor
rule to match inﬂation and GDP moments over the post-war period. In the case of
an exogenous government spending process, its characteristics are also taken from the
estimates in (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2006) and are based on the estimation of an
AR(1) process using HP-ﬁltered data for government spending between 1947 and 2004,
ρG = 0.87 and σG = 0.016. The mark-up shocks follow the estimated process in (Ireland,
2004), ρη = 0.9625 and ση = 0.0012. Finally, the steady-state inﬂation rate of 3.5% per
year is based on the U.S. data average between 1947 and 2004, and implies that, under
our various descriptions of policy, the nominal interest rate never breaches the zero-lower
bound for plausible draws of the shocks.
3. Optimal Ramsey Policy
In this section, we consider the nature of optimal policy in response to exogenous
shocks. The optimal policy problem can be set up in terms of a Lagrangian as,
L0 = max
yt
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt[U(yt+1,yt,yt−1,ut)− λtf(yt+1,yt,yt−1,ut)]
where yt and ut are vectors of the model’s endogenous and exogenous variables, respec-
tively, U(yt+1,yt,yt−1,ut) =
(Xt)
1−σ
1−σ − (Nt)
1+υ
1+υ + χ
G (X
G
t )
1−σ
1−σ , f(yt+1,yt,yt−1,ut) = 0
are the model’s equilibrium conditions (equations (A.2) - (A.21) in Appendix Appendix
A.3), and λt is a vector of Lagrange multipliers associated with these constraints.
The optimization implies the following ﬁrst order conditions,
Et
[
∂U(.)
∂yt
+ βF
∂U(.)
∂yt−1
+ β−1λt−1F−1
∂f(.)
∂yt+1
+ λt
∂f(.)
∂yt
+ βλt+1F
∂f(.)
∂yt−1
]
= 0 (12)
15In the case where the government has access to lump-sum taxes to balance the budget, the optimal
steady state tax rate would be −0.14 with no habits, reﬂecting the long-run ineﬃciency due to monopo-
listic competition, and a very large 0.83 under the benchmark value of habits, reﬂecting the consumption
externality.
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Parameter Value Description
1/β (1.04)1/4 Real interest rate
σ 2 Inverse of intertemporal elasticity of substitution
Nw 1.3 Frisch labor supply elasticity
η 8.13 Elasticity of substitution between goods
ϕ 26.34 Price adjustment cost parameter
θ 0.86 Degree of habit formation in private goods consumption
θG 0.86 Degree of habit formation in public goods consumption
χG 0.143 Relative weight on utility from public goods consumption
πC (1.035)1/4 Gross CPI inﬂation rate.
B/GDP 0.55 × 4 Debt to GDP ratio
ρA 0.8556 Persistence of technology
ρη 0.9625 Persistence of markup shock process
ρG 0.87 Persistence of exogenous government spending
σA 0.006 Standard deviation of technology process
ση 0.0012 × ϕ Standard deviation of markup shock process
σG 0.016 Standard deviation of exogenous government spending
Table 1: Parameter values used in simulations
where F is the lead operator, such that F−1 is a one-period lag. A second-order accurate
solution to optimal policy then involves solving these ﬁrst order conditions in combina-
tion with the non-linear equilibrium conditions of the model, f(ys+1,ys,ys−1,us) = 0,
using the perturbation methods of (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2004b).
In order to explore the contribution of ﬁscal policy instruments to optimal stabi-
lization in a sticky price economy featuring deep habits, we gradually introduce ﬁscal
considerations to the policy problem. To begin with, we consider the nature of the ﬁscal
policy transmission mechanism by introducing exogenous government spending shocks
to a model variant where monetary policy is optimal. This allows us to explore the
crowding-in results of (Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe, 2006) in an economy where
monetary policy is conducted optimally and where we can make diﬀerent assumptions
about the pricing of private and public goods. We then allow government spending to
be varied as part of optimal policy, to assess whether or not government spending (as
a proxy for the manipulation of aggregate demand through ﬁscal policy) contributes to
stabilization policy. In both cases, we temporarily abstract from ﬁscal solvency issues
by assuming the policy maker has access to a lump-sum tax through which to balance
the budget. We then relax this assumption and consider the optimal policy response
to technology and cost-push shocks, when taxes are distortionary and Ricardian equiv-
alence no longer holds. In all cases, we consider optimal policies with commitment.
Finally, in Section 4 we explore the ability of a set of simple (linear) policy rules to
replicate the Ramsey policy.
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3.1. Exogenous Government Spending and Optimal Monetary Policy
We ﬁrst consider the case when ﬁscal policy is exogenous, while monetary policy
is set optimally under commitment, and the government has access to lump-sum taxes
to balance its budget. We assume that government spending follows an exogenous
stationary process, lnGt = (1− ρG) lnG+ ρG lnGt−1 + Gt , with persistence parameter
ρG ∈ (0, 1) and random shocks Gt ∼ iidN
(
0, σ2G
)
. Even though government spending is
exogenous, households still derive utility from the consumption of public goods and form
habits accordingly. The monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate to maximize
households’ welfare subject to the private sector’s response and given the exogenous
processes. We analyze the implications of this policy in terms of impulse responses to a
government spending shock since this allows us to explore the nature of the ﬁscal policy
transmission mechanism in a model with deep habits.
A Positive Government Spending Shock Figure 1 details the impulse re-
sponses to a positive government spending shock in three cases - no habits, habits of
θ = θG = 0.86 and common pricing across private and public goods and, ﬁnally, the
same degree of habits, but with price discrimination across public and private goods.
Consider the case without habits: the increase in government spending results in an
increase in aggregate demand which the monetary authority oﬀsets by raising real in-
terest rates and discouraging household consumption. The policy maker does this until
consumption falls by enough that labor supply increases essentially match the increase
in labor demand and the marginal costs of production are largely unchanged (although
they actually fall slightly in the initial period, as does inﬂation). Therefore, the essence
of the optimal policy in the absence of habits lies in ensuring the inﬂationary conse-
quences of the increase in government spending are largely negated.
Within this policy response, there is actually a feature of optimal policy under com-
mitment which is not easy to discern from the plots of the impulse response functions -
the presence of price level control. As noted by Woodford (2003), under commitment,
a policy maker facing the constraint implied by the New Keynesian Phillips curve will
ﬁnd it optimal to not only stabilize inﬂation following shocks, but will also seek to sta-
bilize the price level itself. Accordingly, the policy maker actually matches the initial
fall in inﬂation with a prolonged period of slightly positive inﬂation. This mitigates the
inﬂationary consequences of the government spending shock while achieving the best
balance between private and public consumption. This feature of optimal policy will be
more apparent when we consider the same shock in the presence of deep habits.
We then consider the case where household preferences include deep habits over both
private and public goods (θ = θG = 0.86) and where the suppliers of these goods are
constrained to supply to the private and public sectors at the same price. Here, the
increased demand for goods tempts ﬁrms to reduce their mark-ups in order to capture
a larger share of the increased overall product demand. Ceteris paribus, this will tend
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to stimulate consumption. The policy maker wishes to discourage the formation of such
habits eﬀects and so aggressively raises interest rates at the start of the simulation, which
encourages households to save rather than consume and reduces the discounted value
of the sales generated by price cuts oﬀered by ﬁrms. Despite this, the desire to gain
market share is so great that the increase in government spending crowds in private
consumption. As the shock passes, the policy maker wishes to mitigate the costs of
falling habits-adjusted consumption and so relaxes policy for a time, before ultimately
tightening it again. This cyclical behavior in policy making reﬂects the combined eﬀects
of the dynamics of habits-adjusted consumption and the implementation of a policy of
price level control.
Finally, we consider a variant with the same degree of habits but where the producers
can charge diﬀerent prices to the private and public sectors. Here, the markup charged
to the public sector is substantially reduced, but the government spending shock does
not have a direct impact on the markup charged to the private sector’s consumption
goods, and private consumption is crowded out. The increase in aggregate demand
due to the increase in public consumption does raise marginal costs and consumer price
inﬂation. In the presence of nominal inertia, this implies that markups in the production
of the private consumption goods fall. However, this decline is signiﬁcantly smaller than
the corresponding fall in the markup charged to the public sector. Also, in order to
reduce the inﬂationary eﬀect, monetary policy is tightened by more in the initial period
than it would be under common pricing, which further discourages private consumption.
There is then the same relaxation and subsequent tightening of policy which minimizes
the costs of inﬂation and habits-adjusted consumption gaps, partly by relying on the
expectational beneﬁts of price-level control.
The crowding-in eﬀects are eﬀectively the result of the common pricing behavior
by ﬁrms, combined with suﬃcient degrees of habits formation in private and public
goods consumption.16 Figure 2 shows the response of consumption under diﬀerent com-
binations of habits. For common levels of habits across private and public goods, the
existence of crowding-in eﬀects when monetary policy is optimal requires a degree of
habits in excess of 0.72. However, for diﬀering levels of habits in public and private goods
consumption, a higher degree of habits in one can compensate, to varying degrees, for
a lower degree of habits in the other and still support the crowding-in of private con-
sumption. The crowding-in eﬀects disappear if, for example, private goods consumption
habits are at their benchmark level, θ = 0.86, but there are no habits in public goods
consumption, θG = 0, or vice versa (the latter is shown by the dash-dot lines in Figure
2). However, as the markup eﬀects on private consumption are important in generating
these results, higher degrees of habits formation in private consumption can restore the
crowding-in eﬀects, as is the case when θG = 0 but θ = 0.96 (which is the upper bound
16Our results also diﬀer from early studies in that we are assuming an optimal monetary policy.
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of the estimates in Ravn et al (2006)). Similarly, maintaining habits in public consump-
tion at their benchmark level of 0.86 will result in crowding-in eﬀects, provided the level
of habits in private goods θ is of at least 0.4 (the stars impulse response in Figure 2
illustrate such a case).
3.2. Endogenous Government Spending and Optimal Monetary Policy
In this subsection, we analyze the optimal policy response to technology and mark-
up shocks, where the nominal interest rate and government spending serve as policy
instruments. We continue to ignore the budgetary consequences of policy by assuming
ﬁscal authorities have access to a lump-sum tax with which to balance the budget.
A Technology Shock Figure 3 analyses the response to a positive technology
shock and includes three cases - no habits eﬀects and the case of deep habits with ei-
ther common or discriminatory pricing across private and public goods. In the absence
of habits eﬀects, policy seeks to eliminate the inﬂationary consequences of the shock,
leaving consumption, government spending and output suboptimally low due to the dis-
tortionary eﬀects of monopolistic competition. If the policy maker were forced to behave
in a time consistent manner, then this permanent distortion would result in an inﬂa-
tionary bias, but under commitment the policy maker is able to resist the temptation to
introduce policy surprises in order to oﬀset this distortion. Therefore, the policy maker
raises public consumption and relaxes monetary policy to boost private consumption.
These policies exactly balance the reduction in marginal costs that would otherwise arise
as a result of the technology shock, so that inﬂation is zero throughout the simulation.
When we introduce signiﬁcant deep habits eﬀects, the nature of the distortion
changes as households now over-consume, due to the habits externality, thus imply-
ing signiﬁcant consumption and output gaps (the diﬀerence between actual output and
the eﬃcient level of output, as a percentage of the eﬃcient level17) of 68% and 52%,
respectively.18 In the face of this enormous externality, monetary policy no longer seeks
to solely stabilize inﬂation. Real interest rates are initially tightened to prevent the
formation of such damaging habits externalities, while inﬂation falls initially. As the
shock dissipates, policy is slowly relaxed to support the slow unwinding of increased
stock of consumption habits. Given the expectational beneﬁts of price level control in
a forward looking model, monetary policy actually switches from its initial tightened
stance to a more accommodative stance and the initial fall in inﬂation is oﬀset by a
subsequent rise. Therefore, we can see that the conduct of monetary policy has been
signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the introduction of deep habits. In contrast, it is interesting to
17See Appendix Appendix A.5 for the details of the social planner’s problem.
18In the absence of habits, the monopolistic competition and tax distortions would imply that output
is sub-optimally low. However, as the degree of habits increases, the consumption externality begins to
dominate rendering output ineﬃciently high.
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note that the government spending gap is small relative to the very large consumption
and output gaps. Therefore, despite the fact that introducing deep habits implies the
economy faces a massive distortion and the output multipliers associated with the gov-
ernment spending instrument rise from signiﬁcantly below to above one, there is still
little reliance on the government spending gap as a tool of stabilization policy. This is
a pattern that will re-emerge throughout our simulations.19
A Mark-Up Shock We then consider the response of policy to a markup shock,
taken as a 1% increase in ηt, which represents a decrease in the ﬁrms’ desired markup.
In this case, the policy maker faces a trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and output stabilization
even in the absence of habits, as inﬂation falls while output rises. With little change
in government spending, interest rates are initially raised in order to reduce aggregate
demand and the size of the output gap, while allowing for additional deﬂation. This
is illustrated by the dotted lines in Figure 4. Again, the initial deﬂation is oﬀset by a
subsequent period of slightly lower interest rates and raised inﬂation, which is diﬃcult
to discern in the Figure, and the government spending gap is negligible in comparison
to the output and consumption gaps, which bear the brunt of the economic adjustment
to the shock.
In the presence of deep habits, the reduction in markup reduces the value of retaining
market share and ﬁrms seek to raise the prices of their goods, and we observe a rise
in inﬂation. As a result the initial tightening of monetary policy is even stronger, as
the policy maker attempts to curb the large output gap that can ensue due to over-
consumption eﬀects. Following this initial tightening of policy, there is the now familiar
relaxation of policy which supports habits-adjusted consumption as the mark-up shock
fades away. This relaxation of policy is later moderated to achieve a slight fall in
inﬂation, expectations of which reduce the initial rise in inﬂation and is a feature of
the ability to make credible policy promises under commitment. While the ability to
price discriminate across private and public goods does not have much bearing on the
results,20 the time-varying markups that arise under deep habits are shown to play an
important role in the optimal policy response to cost-push shocks.
3.3. Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy
We now turn to the analysis of optimal Ramsey policy when policy makers have
control over monetary policy and both ﬁscal policy instruments - government spending
and income taxes, but where they no longer have access to lump-sum taxes to satisfy
19It should be noted that, even though the government spending gap is often small, this need not
imply that government spending itself does not respond to shocks. The government spending gap is
measured relative to the eﬃcient level of public goods consumption and this responds to technology
shocks but not to markup shocks. Hence, under the Ramsey policy, there will be relatively signiﬁcant
movements in the level of government spending in the former case.
20Impulse responses across the two types of pricing behavior are virtually the same.
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the government’s budget constraint. It is important to note that, if we did continue to
remove the need to adjust either government spending or distortionary taxes to satisfy
the intertemporal budget constraint, then the policy maker can achieve the ﬁrst best
allocation using the income tax instrument to oﬀset the consumption externality and
the mark-up shocks, while using the interest rate to oﬀset the nominal inertia costs of
technology shocks.
Before considering the response to technology and mark-up shocks, it is interesting
to consider the initial steady-state of the Ramsey policy. This is computed by solving
the steady-state of the Ramsey ﬁrst-order conditions and the equilibrium conditions
describing our New Keynesian economy, conditional on an initial government debt to
GDP ratio. In the case of our model without habits, the combination of the monopo-
listic competition and tax distortions suppresses output below its socially eﬃcient level.
Interestingly, the optimal policy implies that the absolute size of the government spend-
ing gap is signiﬁcantly smaller than the consumption gap. The intuition for this pattern
lies in the desire to support the debt stock with the optimal combination of eﬃciency
gaps in variables without generating any steady-state inﬂation. In the case of habits,
the consumption externality renders the level of output too high despite the presence of
monopolistic competition and distortionary taxation. As a result the consumption and
government spending gaps are positive, but the consumption gap is four times the size
of the government spending gap.
We now consider the nature of the policy response to technology and cost-push
shocks, in this highly distorted environment. Figure 5 details the response to a 1% pos-
itive technology shock. A key element of the policy response is that the steady-state of
government debt follows a random walk as in (Benigno and Woodford, 2003), (Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe, 2004a), and (Leith and Wren-Lewis, 2013). The basic intuition for this
is that in a sticky-price environment adjusting ﬁscal instruments to oﬀset ﬁscal shocks
is costly, such that policy makers ensure that policy instruments are adjusted to service
the new steady-state debt that emerges following shocks, but the policy maker commits
to not attempting to do more. In the absence of habits, gap variables are adjusted to
their new steady-state values from the second period onwards, and debt slowly evolves to
its new steady-state consistent with those variables. Real interest rates are adjusted in
the face of the technology shock to maintain consumption at its new constant gap value.
With a positive technology shock, tax rates fall and government spending, consumption
and output rise to support the lower steady-state debt stock without aﬀecting inﬂation.
As shown in (Leith and Wren-Lewis, 2013), the behavior in the initial period is slightly
diﬀerent as the policy maker exploits the fact that expectations are given to reduce the
impact of the shock on debt. Accordingly, in the initial period the fall in real interest
rates is moderated (to mitigate the fall in debt service costs and oﬀset the increase in
the tax base) and encourage a surprise deﬂation in the initial period (although taxes rise
to partially oﬀset this deﬂation) - the combined impact of this is to reduce the eventual
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decline in debt that would otherwise emerge.21
When there are deep habits in consumption, the policy maker needs to minimize both
the consumption externality and the costs of nominal inertia. Despite this additional
trade-oﬀ, the assignment of instruments remains similar, although the stabilization of
gap variables at their new long-run levels is no longer immediately after the initial
period (it should be noted that the transition to the new steady-state still retains the
property that inﬂation is eﬀectively zero beyond the ﬁrst two periods). Monetary policy
adjusts interest rates to help stabilize the consumption gap in the face of the technology
shock, and tax rates are adjusted to largely oﬀset the extra consumption generated by
the technology shock in the presence of habits, while together ensuring that inﬂation
is near zero from the third period onwards. The pattern of adjustment in the ﬁrst
two periods is interesting and captures the essence of the trade-oﬀ facing the policy
maker. In the ﬁrst period, the policy maker tightens monetary policy to reduce the
formation of undesirable habits eﬀects, which tends to reduce inﬂation (it amounts to a
negative inﬂation surprise in the ﬁrst period), while the tax rate is slightly reduced. The
combined eﬀects of these changes are to actually increase the real value of government
debt initially, despite the positive technology shock resulting in an increase in the tax
base. This initial increase in debt then reduces the size of the steady-state fall in debt
which ultimately emerges once the shock has passed. In the next period, there is a slight
switch in the assignment of policy instruments as monetary policy is relaxed and higher
taxation is used to discourage over-consumption. Anticipation of this second period tax
increase mitigates the initial fall in inﬂation which is costly given the price adjustment
costs. Using taxation in this way in the initial period is undesirable as the inﬂationary
consequences of the tax increase would have reduced the initial debt level and implied
greater adjustment to support the new lower steady-state debt level that would have
implied.
We now consider the mark-up shock, detailed in Figure 6. In the absence of habits,
the tax rate is employed to mitigate the impact of the mark-up shock while maintaining
the consumption, government spending and output gaps close to their new steady-state
values. In the initial period, there is an attempt to oﬀset the long-run reduction in
government debt following the negative mark-up shock, primarily through tightening
monetary policy (which increases debt service costs, reduces the size of the tax base and
supports a surprise deﬂation). When we introduce deep habits, the policy maker has to
consider both the consumption externality and the mark-up shock. As a result, the tax
rate is raised more aggressively than in the absence of habits and inﬂation rises rather
than falls. This reduces the initial stock of debt, which is undesirable, but helps reduce
21(Leith and Wren-Lewis, 2013) show that the combination of instruments used in the initial period
depends crucially upon the degree of price stickiness and the steady state debt-GDP ratio. In our bench-
mark calibration, debt service costs and inﬂationary surprises are particularly eﬀective in inﬂuencing
the level of government debt.
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the initial increase in the stock of consumption habits. Nevertheless, gap variables are
driven to their new steady-state values, which support the new steady-state value of
debt without, subsequently, generating inﬂation.
We note that an economy where ﬁrms can price discriminate between private and
public consumption is very similar to the one in which they are constrained to a common
price policy. The responses to technology and mark-up shocks under optimal Ramsey
policies are almost identical across the two types of pricing behavior. This is largely
because the policy maker does not rely on government spending as a stabilization tool
even when it can potentially have a large impact on aggregate demand through its ability
to crowd-in private consumption.
In summary, the presence of deep habits, calibrated at empirically plausible levels,
radically alters some aspects of the optimal policy problem. In particular, the evolution
of monetary policy in response to government spending, technology and markup shocks
seeks to balance the optimal path of habits-adjusted consumption with the need to mini-
mize the costs of nominal inertia. Here the impact of monetary policy on the endogenous
markups implied by pricing in the face of deep habits is key. While distortionary in-
come taxes can also be an eﬀective tool in oﬀsetting habits externalities. The endogenous
mark-ups also imply that government spending shocks can crowd in private consump-
tion, in line with the empirical evidence, but diﬀerently from other models of habits.
However, despite this fundamental change in the ﬁscal policy transmission mechanism,
it is still the case that government spending gaps remain small in the face of technology
and mark-up shocks, even as consumption and output gaps remain pronounced.
4. Optimal Simple Rules
In this section, we consider the ability of simple monetary and ﬁscal rules to achieve
the welfare outcomes commensurate with the fully optimal Ramsey policy.22 The mone-
tary policy rule we consider captures the response of the nominal interest rate to inﬂation
and allows for interest rate inertia
R̂t = φRR̂t−1 + φππ̂
C
t (13)
while the ﬁscal policy rules capture the adjustment of ﬁscal instruments (the tax rate
and government spending) in response to debt dynamics:
τ̂ t = γb̂t−1
Ĝt = κb̂t−1
22We consider the determinacy properties of the rules in the Appendix, which shows that the usual
characterisation of active/passive monetary and ﬁscal policies can be aﬀected by the extent of deep
habits, in a manner which extends the eﬀects of deep habits reported in (Leith, Moldovan, and Rossi,
2012) and (Zubairy, 2010a). Nevertheless the optimized rules reported below are all determinate.
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These speciﬁcations are similar to those considered in (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2007),
(Linnemann, 2006), and (Leith and von Thadden, 2008) for the tax rule, and (Leith and
Wren-Lewis, 2000) for the government spending rule. We do not allow for output terms
in the rules as these are typically found to be unimportant in the design of optimal simple
rules - see, (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2007) - indeed we ﬁnd that certain permutations
of these rules can achieve the welfare levels observed under the Ramsey policy.
We search across the rule parameter space using the Simplex method employed
by the Fminsearch algorithm in Matlab (see, (Lagarias, Reeds, Wright, and Wright,
1998)) in order to minimize the second order approximation to the conditional welfare
losses associated with the rule. We consider various permutations of rules and contrast
their optimal parameterization with and without habits eﬀects. This reveals striking
diﬀerences in the characterization of optimal rules, which mirrors the diﬀerences in
Ramsey policy with and without habits. The optimal parameterization of the tax and
monetary policy rules under our benchmark calibration is given by
R̂t = 1.0273R̂t−1 + 0.1163π̂Ct
τ̂ t = 1.2771b̂t−1
while the same rules in the absence of habits are optimally given by
R̂t = 1.0046R̂t−1 + 4.8139πCt
τ̂ t = 0.08211b̂t−1
In both cases, this combination of rules achieves welfare levels which are indistinguish-
able from those attained by the Ramsey optimal policy, however the optimal rule co-
eﬃcients are radically diﬀerent across the habits and non-habits versions of the model.
Without habits, we obtain the usual result that the interest rate rule should be inertial
(in fact super-inertial in this case) and featuring a strong response to inﬂation, to mimic
some of the commitment beneﬁts of price level control, while in line with the random
walk in debt found under the Ramsey policy, the tax response to movements in gov-
ernment debt should be suﬃcient to stabilise debt, but extremely slowly. In contrast,
in the model with deep habits the optimized rule coeﬃcients imply a much stronger
ﬁscal adjustment through the tax rate, which moves more than one-for-one with the
level of debt, not to stabilize debt rapidly per se, but to allow the tax rate to mimic the
Ramsey response to the consumption externality. Moreover, while the interest rate rule
retains its superinertial response to the lagged interest rate when we introduce habits,
the weight attached to inﬂation in the rule is greatly reduced, as the policy maker faces a
signiﬁcant trade-oﬀ in stabilising inﬂation and the consumption externality, but can also
rely on the inﬂationary eﬀects of tax rates acting in a stabilizing manner. Eﬀectively,
the monetary and tax rule combine to manage the consumption externality without
22
generating excessive inﬂation.23
When, instead, the ﬁscal policy rule is described in terms of changes in government
spending, the optimal parameterization in the presence of habits is
R̂t = 1.0558R̂t−1 + 0.1297π̂Ct
Ĝt = −0.1337b̂t−1
and in the absence of habits
R̂t = 1.0031R̂t−1 + 0.4688π̂Ct
Ĝt = −0.1208b̂t−1
In this case, government spending does not play a particularly signiﬁcant role in stabi-
lizing the economy, other than doing the minimum necessary to ensure stability of the
stock of government debt, regardless of the presence or absence of habits eﬀects. Since
the government spending rule does not contribute much to macroeconomic stabilization,
welfare is signiﬁcantly lower under this combination of rules, with the welfare costs of
shocks under the rules being equivalent to 0.056% of consumption in the presence of
habits under the Ramsey policy.
Finally, we consider the case where we combine a monetary policy rule with ﬁscal
rules for both taxes and government spending with habits
R̂t = 1.019R̂t−1 + 0.0842π̂Ct
τ̂ t = 1.5659b̂t−1
Ĝt = 0.1799b̂t−1
and without
R̂t = 0.9918R̂t−1 + 4.1916π̂Ct
τ̂ t = 0.0672b̂t−1
Ĝt = −0.0179b̂t−1
Again the diﬀerent parameterizations reﬂect the changing nature of the policy problem
in the presence of deep habits. Without habits, we obtain a very strong anti-inﬂationary
monetary policy rule which attempts to mimic Ramsey policy through adding history
dependence in the form of interest rate inertia. While ﬁscal policy in the form of both tax
and spending rules very gradually responds to movements in government debt - merely
doing what is necessary to achieve ﬁscal solvency and playing little role in macroeco-
nomic stabilization. When we introduce habits eﬀects, the monetary policy response
23Impulse response functions for these rules are available upon request. However, they are similar to
the best performing rules presented below.
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to inﬂation is massively reduced, the tax response to government debt hugely increased
and government spending actually rises rather than falls in the presence of an increase in
government debt. As Figures (7) and (8) show, these optimized rules largely succeed in
replicating the Ramsey policy’s responses to both technology and markup shocks, other
than in the initial period of the shock. This implies that they are indistinguishable from
Ramsey in welfare terms.
5. Sensitivity Analysis
In this section and the associated online appendix, we evaluate the sensitivity of our
results with respect to alternative speciﬁcations regarding the labor supply elasticity
and the degree of nominal inertia. We vary these parameters within plausible empirical
ranges, as indentiﬁed in the literature, and consider the economy’s response to the
exogenous government spending shock (under optimal monetary policy), as well as the
responses to technology and markup shocks under the full commitment policy in the
model variant with debt and distortionary taxes.
We observe slight changes in policy setting and the economy’s response to shocks,
but these are primarily quantitative in nature, such that the main conclusions of the
model generally hold.
Considering the Frisch labor supply elasticity, the general pattern of responses to
shocks is similar to the benchmark case, but where a more elastic labor supply typically
implies larger changes in equilibrium labor, output and consumption. This means that,
when faced with an exogenous increase in government expenditures, the crowding-in
eﬀect is larger when labor supply is more elastic, but the eﬀect would be reduced and
can possibly be even reversed for a suﬃciently low labor supply elasticity. In the case of
technology shocks, we note a subtle shift in the monetary policy setting, which does not
relax policy as much in response to an increase in TFP, thus limiting the consumption
response. This is essentially aiming to replicate the eﬀects observed in the social plan-
ner’s allocation - where consumption and output rise by less with a more elastic labor
supply in response to a positive technology shock.24
Varying the degree of nominal inertia aﬀects the relative balance between real and
nominal adjustment as one would expect, but does not aﬀect the qualitative responses
to government spending shocks - the crowding in of private sector consumption remains
- or markup and technology shocks. There is only a slight change in the initial tax policy
in the face of a technology shock, which essentially seeks to enhance the eﬀects of the
initial change in inﬂation on the eventual steady-state stock of debt.
24This result is due to the fact that an increase in TFP allows for an increase in output, while labor
input falls.
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6. Conclusion
In this paper, we explored optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy in a New Keynesian
economy subject to deep habits in consumption, where the habits externality exists at
the level of individual goods. Employing second order approximation methods, we con-
sider various forms of optimal policy of increasing richness in the context of a signiﬁcantly
distorted economy. We begin by considering the consumption response to government
spending shocks, when monetary policy is optimal. We ﬁnd that deep habits can indeed
result in increases in public consumption signiﬁcantly crowding in private consumption,
implying that this modelling device increases government spending multipliers from sig-
niﬁcantly below one, to above one. However, despite the eﬃcacy of this ﬁscal policy
instrument being improved in this sense, it remains the case that government spending
gaps (the diﬀerence between actual government spending and that which would be cho-
sen by a benevolent social planner) under optimal policy are both small and relatively
stable in the face of technology and mark-up shocks. This is in contrast to private con-
sumption and output gaps which are both large in steady state and vary signiﬁcantly in
the face of shocks. In other words, while the introduction of deep habits has signiﬁcant
implications for the conduct of monetary and tax policy, government spending remains
relatively impotent despite the fundamental change in its transmission mechanism.
When we consider the trade-oﬀs between business cycle stabilization and ﬁscal sol-
vency, we ﬁnd that it remains optimal to allow steady-state debt to follow a random
walk following shocks, although the transition to that steady-state is more gradual than
that observed in simpler models, due to the additional consumption externality faced
by the policy maker when consumers possess deep habits. In terms of the operation of
individual instruments, monetary policy largely ensures that the consumption gap is sta-
bilized in the face of technology shocks, while the income tax instrument serves to oﬀset
the consumption externality associated with habits and any shocks to the imperfectly
competitive ﬁrms’ desired markups.
Finally, we assessed the ability of simple linear monetary and ﬁscal policy rules
to achieve the levels of welfare associated with the Ramsey policy. Relatively simple
interest rate and tax rate rules perform well and are able to successfully mimic the
Ramsey policy. However, in doing so their optimized coeﬃcients are radically diﬀerent
from those obtained under similar rules in a model without habits. These diﬀerences
reﬂect the diﬀerent nature of the policy problem under deep habits where the very strong
response of interest rates to inﬂation and of tax rates to government debt (along with
the apparently perverse rule which raises government spending as debt rises) enable debt
to be stabilized gradually, while the combined interest rate and tax policy successfully
manage the evolution of habits-adjusted consumption without generating high rates of
inﬂation.
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Figure 1: Impulse responses to a +1% government spending shock with optimal monetary policy: no
habits (dots) and deep habits
(
θ = θG = 0.86
)
with common pricing (solid line) and with discriminating
pricing (dash lines). The inﬂation and interest rate variables are expressed in annualized terms. Gap
variables under no habits read oﬀ the right y-axis.
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Figure 2: Consumption responses to a +1% government spending shock under optimal monetary policy,
with common pricing of private and public goods: θ = θG = 0.86 (solid line), θ = θG = 0.6 (dashed
line), θ = 0 and θG = 0.86 (dash-dot line), θ = 0.5 and θG = 0.86 (stars).
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Figure 3: Impulse responses to a +1% technology shock with optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy, the
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Figure 6: Impulse responses to a negative markup shock (+ 1% change in ηt) under optimal monetary
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Figure 7: Impulse responses to a +1% technology shock under the Ramsey optimal policy (solid lines)
and the optimal simple rules (dash lines), under the benchmark calibration for deep habits with common
pricing. The inﬂation and interest rate variables are expressed in annualized terms.
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Appendix A. Analytical Details
Appendix A.1. Households
Cost Minimization Households decide the composition of the consumption bas-
ket to minimize expenditures
min
{Ckit}i
∫ 1
0
PCit C
k
itdi
s.t.
(∫ 1
0
(
Ckit − θCit−1
) ηt−1
ηt di
) ηt
ηt−1
≥ Xkt
The demand for individual goods i is
Ckit =
(
PCit
PCt
)−ηt
Xkt + θCit−1.
where PCt can be expressed as an aggregate of the private goods i prices, P
C
t =(∫ 1
0
(
PCit
)1−ηt di) 11−ηt . Averaging across all households gives the overall demand for
private ﬁnal goods as,
Cit =
∫ 1
0
Ckitdk =
(
PCit
PCt
)−ηt
Xt + θCit−1.
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Utility Maximization The solution to the utility maximization problem is ob-
tained by solving the Lagrangian function:
L = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
u
(
Xkt , N
k
t ,X
G,k
t
)
− λkt
(
PCt X
k
t + Ptϑt + EtQt,t+1D
k
t+1 − (1− τ t)WtNkt −Dkt − Φt
)]
(A.1)
In the budget constraint, we have re-expressed the total spending on the private con-
sumption basket,
∫ 1
0 P
C
it C
k
itdi, in terms of quantities that aﬀect the household’s utility,∫ 1
0 P
C
it C
k
itdi = P
C
t X
k
t +P
C
t ϑt, where under deep habits ϑt is given as ϑt ≡ θ
∫ 1
0
(
PCit
PCt
)
Cit−1di.
Households take ϑt as given when maximising utility.
The ﬁrst order conditions are then,(
Xkt
)
: uX(t) = λ
k
t P
C
t(
Nkt
)
: −uN (t) = uX(t) (1 − τ t)WtPCt(
Dkt
)
: 1 = βEt
[
uX(t+1)
uX(t)
PCt
PCt+1
]
Rt
where Rt =
1
Et[Qt,t+1]
is the one-period gross return on nominal riskless bonds.
With utility given by u
(
X,N,XG
)
= X
1−σ
1−σ − N
1+υ
1+υ +χ
G (X
G)
1−σ
1−σ , the ﬁrst derivatives
are
uX (·) = X−σ and uN (·) = −Nυ
Appendix A.2. Firms
The ﬁrms’ proﬁt maximization problem is formally given by:
max
{PFit ,Fit,ZFit ,NFit }
Et
∞∑
s=0
Qt,t+s
⎡⎣PFit+s (Fit+s + ZFit+s)−WtNFit+s − ϕ2
(
PFit+s
πFPFit+s−1
− 1
)2
PFt+sY
F
t+s
⎤⎦
s.t. Fit+s =
(
PFit+s
PFt+s
)−ηt
XFt+s + θ
FFit+s−1
ZFit+s =
(
PFit+s
PFt+s
)−ηt
ZFt+s
Fit+s + ZFit+s = At+sNFit+s, with F = {C,G}
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with the associated Lagrangian as:
L = Et
∞∑
s=0
Qt,t+s
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
[
PFit+s
(
Fit+s +
(
PFit+s
PFt+s
)−ηt
ZFt+s
)
−WtNFit+s − ϕ2
(
PFit+s
πFPFit+s−1
− 1
)2
PFt+sY Ft+s
]
−vFit+s
[
Fit+s −
(
PFit+s
PFt+s
)−ηt
XFt+s − θFFit+s−1
]
−γFit+s
[
Fit+s +
(
PFit+s
PFt+s
)−ηt
ZFt+s −At+sNFit+s
]
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
where we have substituted in for ZFit using the corresponding constraints.
The ﬁrst order condition for labor gives the shadow value γFit =
Wt
At
as the nominal
marginal cost of production, which is the same across ﬁrms. We re-label γFit as MCt.
The other ﬁrst order conditions are, for F = {C,G}:
vFit =
(
PFit −MCt
)
+ θFEt
[
Qt,t+1v
F
it+1
]
and
Y Fit = ηt
(
PFit
PFt
)−ηt−1 (
PFt
)−1 [(
PFit −MCt
)
ZFt + v
F
itX
F
t
]
+ϕ
(
PFit
πFPFit−1
− 1
)
PFt Y Ft
πFPFit−1
− ϕEt
[
Qt,t+1
(
PFit+1
πFPFit
− 1
)
PFit+1
πF
(
PFit
)2PFt+1Y Ft+1
]
where vit and v
G
it are the Lagrange multipliers on the dynamic demand constraints and
represents the shadow prices of sales to the private and the public sector, respectively.
Appendix A.3. Equilibrium Conditions
Xt = Ct − θCt−1 (A.2)
XGt = Gt − θGGt−1 (A.3)
ZCt =
ϕ
2
(
πCt
πC
− 1
)2
Y Ct (A.4)
ZGt =
ϕ
2
(
πGt
πG
− 1
)2
Y Gt (A.5)
−uN (t)
uX (t)
= (1− τ t)Wt
PCt
≡ (1− τ t)wt (A.6)
uX (t) = βEt
[
uX (t+ 1)
(
πCt+1
)−1
Rt
]
(A.7)
ωt =
(
1− 1
μCt
)
+ θβEt
[
uX (t+ 1)
uX (t)
ωt+1
]
(A.8)
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Y Ct = ηt
[(
1− 1
μCt
)
ZCt + ωtXt
]
+ϕ
(
πCt
πC
− 1
)
πCt
πC
Y Ct −ϕβEt
[
uX (t+ 1)
uX (t)
(
πCt+1
πC
− 1
)
πCt+1
πC
Y Ct+1
]
(A.9)
ωGt =
(
1− 1
μGt
)
+ θGβEt
[
uX (t+ 1)
uX (t)
(
πGt+1
πCt+1
)
ωGt+1
]
(A.10)
Y Gt = ηt
[(
1− 1
μGt
)
ZGt + ω
G
t X
G
t
]
+ ϕ
(
πGt
πG
− 1
)
πGt
πG
Y Gt
−ϕβEt
[
uX (t+ 1)
uX (t)
(
πGt+1
πG
− 1
)
πGt+1
πG
(
πGt+1
πCt+1
)
Y Gt+1
]
(A.11)
Y Ct = AtN
C
t (A.12a)
Y Gt = AtN
G
t (A.12b)
Ct +
ϕ
2
(
πCt
πC
− 1
)2
Y Ct = Y
C
t (A.13a)
Gt +
ϕ
2
(
πGt
πG
− 1
)2
Y Gt = Y
G
t (A.13b)
Nt = N
C
t +N
G
t (A.14)
bt = Rt−1
(
πCt
)−1
bt−1 + ζtGt − τ twtNt (A.15)
mct =
wt
At
(A.16)
ζt ≡
PGt
PCt
=
πGt
πCt
ζt−1 (A.17)
μCt =
1
mct
(A.18)
μGt =
ζt
mct
(A.19)
ln ηt =
(
1− ρη
)
ln η + ρη ln ηt−1 + 
η
t (A.20)
lnAt = ρA lnAt−1 + 
A
t (A.21)
Without price discrimination, there is a common mark-up across private and public
goods and the pricing equations become:
Yt = ηt
[(
1− 1
μCt
)
Zt + ωtXt + ω
G
t X
G
t
]
+ϕ
(
πCt
πC
− 1
)
πCt
πC
Yt−ϕβEt
[
uX (t+ 1)
uX (t)
(
πCt+1
πC
− 1
)
πCt+1
πC
Yt+1
]
(A.22)
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ωt =
(
1− 1
μCt
)
+ θβEt
[
uX (t+ 1)
uX (t)
ωt+1
]
(A.23)
ωGt =
(
1− 1
μCt
)
+ θGβEt
[
uX (t+ 1)
uX (t)
ωGt+1
]
(A.24)
And the aggregate resource constraint is
Ct +Gt +
ϕ
2
(
πCt
πC
− 1
)2
Yt = Yt (A.25)
where
Yt = AtNt. (A.26)
Deﬁnitions:
ωt ≡ vt
PCt
; ωGt ≡
vGt
PGt
μCt ≡
PCt
MCt
; μGt ≡
PGt
MCt
πCt ≡
PCt
PCt−1
; πGt ≡
PGt
PGt−1
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Appendix A.4. The Deterministic Steady State
The non-stochastic long-run equilibrium is characterized by constant real variables
and nominal variables growing at a constant rate. Price adjustment costs are zero,
ZC = ZG = 0, while the rest of the equilibrium conditions reduce to:
X = (1− θ)C (A.27)
XG =
(
1− θG)G (A.28)
NυXσ = (1− τ)w (A.29)
1 = βR
(
πC
)−1
(A.30)
(1− θβ)ω =
(
1− 1
μC
)
(A.31)
Y C = ηωX (A.32)(
1− θGβπ
G
πC
)
ωG =
(
1− 1
μG
)
(A.33)
Y G = ηωGXG (A.34)
Y C = ANC (A.35a)
Y G = ANG (A.35b)
C = Y C (A.36a)
G = Y G (A.36b)
N = NC +NG (A.37)(
1−R/πC) b = ζG− τwN (A.38)
mc =
w
A
(A.39)
ζ =
πG
πC
ζ (A.40)
μC =
1
mc
(A.41)
μG =
ζ
mc
(A.42)
A = 1 (A.43)
Without price discrimination the mark-up equations become:
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Y = η
(
ωX + ωGXG
)
(A.44)
(1− θβ)ω =
(
1− 1
μC
)
(A.45)
(
1− θGβ)ωG = (1− 1
μC
)
(A.46)
and the aggregate resource constraint is
C +G = Y = AN (A.47)
Table 1 contains the imposed calibration restrictions. We assume values for the
Frisch labor supply elasticity (1/υ), and the following parameters, β, σ, η, ϕ, θ, θG, and
χG. In describing optimal policy, we take the second order approximation around the
Ramsey steady-state, which is obtained by the solving the steady-state of the model
(as given by equations (A.27) - (A.47)), conditional on the optimal rate of inﬂation and
levels of taxation and government spending (for a given government debt to GDP ratio)
which are obtained by simultaneously solving the Ramsey ﬁrst order conditions in (12).
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Appendix A.5. The Social Planner’s Problem
In order to assess the trade-oﬀs facing the policy maker in a sticky-price economy
subject to tax, monopolistic competition and consumption externality distortions, it is
helpful to compute the eﬃcient allocation that would be chosen by a social planner.
The social planner ignores the nominal inertia and all other ineﬃciencies and chooses
real allocations that maximize the representative consumer’s utility subject to the ag-
gregate production function and the law of motion for habit-adjusted private and public
consumption:
max
{Xt,Ct,Nt,XGt ,Gt}
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu
(
X∗t , N
∗
t ,X
G∗
t
)
s.t. C∗t +G
∗
t = AtN
∗
t
X∗t = C
∗
t − θC∗t−1
XG∗t = G
∗
t − θGG∗t−1
The optimal choice implies the following relationship between the marginal rate of
substitution between labor and habit-adjusted private consumption and the intertem-
poral marginal rate of substitution in habit-adjusted private consumption
(N∗t )
υ
(X∗t )
−σ = At
[
1− θβEt
(
X∗t+1
X∗t
)−σ]
.
In addition, the balance between private and public consumption is given by,
(X∗t )
−σ − θβEt
(
X∗t+1
)−σ
= χG[
(
XG∗t
)−σ − θGβEt (XG∗t+1)−σ].
The deterministic steady state equivalent of these expressions are (N∗)υ (X∗)σ =
A (1− θβ) and (C∗G∗ )−σ = χG ( 1−θGβ1−θβ )(1−θG1−θ )−σ, which upon further substitutions can
be written as,
(N∗)υ+σ [(1− θ)Ψ∗A]σ = A (1− θβ)
and (
Ψ∗
1−Ψ∗
)−σ
= χG
(
1− θGβ
1− θβ
)(
1− θG
1− θ
)−σ
,
where Ψ∗ is the optimal steady state share of private consumption, Ψ∗ ≡ C∗C∗+G∗ . In the
case of equal habits in the two types of consumption goods, the last expression simpliﬁes
to
(
Ψ∗
1−Ψ∗
)−σ
= χG.
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Appendix A.6. Log-linear Representation
Log-linearizing the equilibrium conditions (A.2) - (A.21) around the deterministic
steady state gives the following set of equations. Note that the price adjustment costs
are zero in log-linear form, ẐFt = 0, for F = {C,G}. Then, we have
X̂t = (1− θ)−1
(
Ĉt − θĈt−1
)
X̂Gt =
(
1− θG)−1 (Ĝt − θGĜt−1)
σX̂t + υN̂t = ŵt − τ
1− τ τ̂ t
X̂t = EtX̂t+1 − 1
σ
(
R̂t − Etπ̂Ct+1
)
Ŷ Ct = ω̂t + X̂t + η̂t + ϕ
(
π̂Ct − βEtπ̂Ct+1
)
(A.48)
ω̂t =
1
μCω
μ̂Ct + θβEtω̂t+1 + θβσ
(
X̂t −EtX̂t+1
)
Ŷ Gt = ω̂
G
t + X̂
G
t + η̂t +
ϕ
1 + κf
(
π̂Gt − βEtπ̂Gt+1
)
(A.49)
ω̂Gt =
1
μGωG
μ̂Gt + θ
GβEt
(
ω̂Gt+1 + π̂
G
t+1 − π̂Ct+1
)
+ θGβσ
(
X̂t − EtX̂t+1
)
Ĉt = Ŷ
C
t = Ât + N̂
C
t
Ĝt = Ŷ
G
t = Ât + N̂
G
t
A weighted combination of the market clearing conditions, gives an aggregate pro-
duction relationship
ΥĈt + (1−Υ) Ĝt = Ât + N̂t
with Υ being the share of relative labor inputs in the production of private and public
consumption, Υ ≡ CC+G = N
C
N .
N̂t = ΥN̂
C
t + (1−Υ) N̂Gt
b̂t = R
(
πC
)−1
(R̂t−Etπ̂Ct+1)+R
(
πC
)−1
b̂t−1+
Gζ
b
(Ĝt+ μ̂
G
t − μ̂Ct )−
τwN
b
(τ̂ t+ ŵt+ N̂t)
m̂ct = ŵt − Ât
ζ̂t = π̂
G
t − π̂Ct + ζ̂t−1
μ̂Ct = −m̂ct
μ̂Gt = ζ̂t + μ̂
C
t
η̂t = ρηη̂t−1 + 
η
t
Ât = ρAÂt−1 + 
A
t
44
The New Keynesian Phillips curves are given by the pricing equations (A.48) and
(A.49)
π̂Ct = βEtπ̂
C
t+1 +
1
ϕ
(
Ŷ Ct − ω̂t − X̂t
)
− 1
ϕ
η̂t
and
π̂Gt = βEtπ̂
G
t+1 +
1
ϕ
(
Ŷ Gt − ω̂Gt − X̂Gt
)
− 1
ϕ
η̂t
Under common pricing behavior by ﬁrms, the corresponding NK Phillips curve,
derived from (A.22), is:
π̂Ct = βEtπ̂
C
t+1 +
1
ϕ
[
Ŷt − ϑ
(
ω̂t + X̂t
)
− (1− ϑ)
(
ω̂Gt + X̂
G
t
)]
− 1
ϕ
η̂t (A.50)
where : ϑ ≡ ωX
ωX + ωGXG
and the equations deﬁning the shadow values ω̂t and ω̂
G
t are
ω̂t =
1
μCω
μ̂Ct + θβEtω̂t+1 + θβσ
(
X̂t − EtX̂t+1
)
ω̂Gt =
1
μCωG
μ̂Ct + θ
GβEtω̂
G
t+1 + θ
Gβσ
(
X̂t − EtX̂t+1
)
Equal habits
(
θ = θG
)
:
In this case, there is only one shadow value of output, i.e. ω̂t = ω̂
G
t , while the steady
state expression for the markup simpliﬁes to
(
1− 1
μC
)
= 1−θβη(1−θ) , which also gives ϑ = Υ.
The NKPC (A.50) then reduces to
π̂Ct = βEtπ̂
C
t+1 +
1
ϕ
[
Ŷt − ω̂t −
(
ΥX̂t + (1−Υ) X̂Gt
)]
− 1
ϕ
η̂t
No habits
(
θ = θG = 0
)
:
Without habits, X̂t = Ĉt and X̂
G
t = Ĝt which implies ΥX̂t + (1−Υ) X̂Gt = ΥĈt +
(1−Υ) Ĝt = Ŷt. At the same time 1μCω = η − 1 and ω̂t = (η − 1) μ̂Ct = − (η − 1) m̂ct
and the NKPC becomes the usual expression
π̂Ct = βEtπ̂
C
t+1 +
(
η − 1
ϕ
)
m̂ct − 1
ϕ
η̂t
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Appendix B. Determinacy Analysis
In this section we embed our policy rules in a log-linearized version of our equilibrium
conditions described in Appendix Appendix A.6 in order to assess their determinacy
properties, as a precursor to optimizing their coeﬃcients in the main body of the paper.
Here, the benchmark results in the literature stem from (Leeper, 1991) who provides
the original characterization of policy rules as being ‘active’ or ‘passive’. An active mon-
etary policy rule is one in which the monetary authority satisﬁes the Taylor principle
in that they adjust nominal interest rates such that real interest rates rise in response
to excess inﬂation. Conversely, a passive monetary rule is one which fails to satisfy this
principle. In (Leeper, 1991)’s terminology a passive ﬁscal policy is one in which the ﬁscal
instrument is adjusted to stabilize the government’s debt stock, while an active ﬁscal
policy fails to do this. (Leeper, 1991) demonstrated, in the context of a lump sum tax
instrument, that it is only active/passive policy combinations that ensure determinacy
of the rational expectations equilibrium. A similar characterization25 emerges in the
context of economies where Ricardian equivalence does not hold and the policy instru-
ment is government spending ((Leith and Wren-Lewis, 2000)) or distortionary taxation
((Linnemann, 2006)). We now revisit these results in our New Keynesian economy with
deep habits. Our simple rules are,
R̂t = φRR̂t−1 + φππ̂
C
t (B.1)
τ̂ t = γb̂t (B.2)
Ĝt = κb̂t. (B.3)
In Figure B.9 we plot the combinations of the ﬁscal feedback from debt to government
spending, κ, and the monetary response to inﬂation, φπ, for various degrees of interest
rate inertia, φR, and deep habits, θ = θ
G, assuming that ﬁnal goods producing ﬁrms
charge the same price to both the private and public sectors. Moving across each row
increases the extent of deep habits, while moving down each column increases the extent
of interest rate inertia. The picture in the top left corner therefore mimics the analysis of
(Leith and Wren-Lewis, 2000). If the monetary policy is active, φπ > 1, then ﬁscal policy
must cut government spending in response to increased government debt. If ﬁscal policy
fails to respond to deviations of debt from steady-state, then the active monetary policy
will give rise to a debt interest spiral which implies instability. Meanwhile if monetary
policy is passive then this can help stabilize debt when ﬁscal policy fails to do so, as the
saddlepath solution delivers a path for real interest rates which oﬀsets the instability
in debt which would otherwise emerge. Finally, if ﬁscal policy is acting to stabilize
25However, the presence of non-Ricardian elements can aﬀect the critical value of ﬁscal response
required to render the ﬁscal policy rule ‘passive’ (see (Leith and Wren-Lewis, 2000)) and, in models with
a richer supply side, can lead to bifurcations in the policy combinations required for determinacy, as in
(Leith and von Thadden, 2008).
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debt, then a passive monetary policy will lead to indeterminacy in the usual manner,
as inﬂationary expectations become self-fulﬁlling (see (Woodford, 2003)). Moving down
the ﬁrst column where we increase the degree of nominal interest rate inertia, then the
critical value for the interest rate response to inﬂation necessary for monetary policy to
be described as active falls below one. This is because it is the long-run response to
inﬂation, φπ1−φR > 1, which is key to deﬁning the Taylor principle in an inertial rule.
As we move across the columns, increasing the degree of deep habits formation, the
determinacy region in the South-East quadrant associated with a combination of an
active monetary policy and a passive ﬁscal policy is reduced. The intuition for this
follows that given in (Leith, Moldovan, and Rossi, 2012) for the case of a monetary
economy. Essentially, as the degree of habits is increased, a normally determinate active
monetary policy can become indeterminate. An increase in inﬂationary expectations
raises real interest rates under an active monetary policy. When the degree of deep
habits is suﬃciently large, this increase in real interest rates causes producers to raise
their markups to such an extent that inﬂation actually rises, thereby validating the
initial rise in inﬂationary expectations. However, as we go down the columns, increasing
the degree of interest rate inertia overturns this eﬀect such that we can achieve the usual
determinate ‘active/passive’ policy mix, provided the monetary policy rule is suﬃciently
inertial.
In Figure B.10 we perform the same analysis in a model variant where ﬁrms can
price discriminate between the private and public sector. As a result the ﬁscal rule does
not directly aﬀect the mark-up charged on goods for the private sector. Nevertheless,
the determinacy properties of the rules are largely unchanged.
In Figure B.11 we consider the case of ﬁscal feedback to the tax rate rather than gov-
ernment spending in an economy where ﬁrms charge the same price to the private and
public sectors. As before, for an economy without habits we ﬁnd that an active/passive
policy combination is necessary to ensure determinacy, although for a strong ﬁscal re-
sponse to debt disequilibrium the response of interest rates to inﬂation needs to be higher
- this is because raising tax rates fuels inﬂation through their impact on marginal costs.
Interestingly, an active monetary policy combined with a ﬁscal policy which fails to raise
taxes in response to higher debt is not always unstable, but can be indeterminate if the
inappropriate ﬁscal response is suﬃciently aggressive, due to the supply side eﬀects of
variations in tax rates. As the degree of habits is increased, the inpact on determinacy
mirrors that for the case of a government spending rule. The loss of determinacy for an
active monetary policy rule reﬂects the same mechanism discussed above.
In Figure B.12 the determinacy properties of the tax rule is considered in an economy
where ﬁnal goods ﬁrms can price discriminate between the private and public sectors -
the analysis is largely unchanged relative to Figure B.11.
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Figure B.9: Determinacy Properties of the Government Spending Rule with Common Pricing: determi-
nacy (light grey), indeterminacy (blanks), and instability (dark grey).
Appendix C. Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we evaluate the sensitivity of our results with respect to alternative
speciﬁcations regarding the labor supply elasticity and the degree of nominal inertia. A
summary of the results is included in the main body of the paper, this appendix pro-
viding the details of the analysis. We consider the economy’s response to an exogenous
government spending shock (under optimal monetary policy), as well as the responses to
technology and markup shocks under the full commitment policy in the model variant
with debt and distortionary taxes. In all cases, we consider a common pricing policy
by ﬁrms, to better gauge the sensitivity of the crowding-in results. This is without loss
when looking at technology and markup shocks as the power to price discriminate plays
virtually no role, when government spending is chosen optimally.
Labor supply elasticity: Macro estimates of the Frisch labor supply elasticity
lie within a wide range, from lower values of 0.4−0.5 in (Smets and Wouters, 2007) and
(Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti, 2013) to very large values of 4 and 5 in (Gali,
Lopez-Salido, and Valles, 2007) or (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2006). We choose 0.5 and
4 as two alternative values, around our benchmark of 1.3.
Figure (C.13) shows the eﬀects of an exogenous increase in government expendi-
tures. As might be expected, when labor supply is relatively more elastic (the dash-dot
impulse responses), equilibrium labor and output increase by more in the face of the
demand shock, supporting an even higher degree of crowding-in of private consumption.
Conversely, when labor supply is more inelastic the crowding in eﬀect can be reduced
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Figure B.10: Determinacy Properties of the Government Spending Rule with Price Discrimination:
determinacy (light grey), indeterminacy (blanks), and instability (dark grey).
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Figure B.11: Determinacy Properties of the Tax Rule with Common Pricing: determinacy (light grey),
indeterminacy (blanks), and instability (dark grey).
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Figure B.12: Determinacy Properties of the Tax Rule with Price Discrimination: determinacy (light
grey), indeterminacy (blanks), and instability (dark grey).
and possibly even reversed for a suﬃciently low Frisch labor supply elasticity, as shown
in Figure (C.13).26
Figures (C.14) and (C.15) illustrate the responses to technology and markup shocks,
under the full optimal policy in the model with government debt and distortionary taxes.
In the face of markup shocks the general pattern of responses are qualitatively similar
to our benchmark case, but with a greater (lesser) increase in consumption and output
when the labor supply elasticity is higher (lower). In the case of technology shocks, the
response remains qualitatively similar, but with a subtle shift in the monetary policy
response to the shock. When labor supply is more elastic, in the face of a technology
shock monetary policy does not reduce real interest rates by as much, such that con-
sumption is not allowed to rise despite the economy’s ability to produce more goods.
As a result, consumption and output rise by less with a more elastic labor supply in the
face of a technology shock. A similar response would be found in the social planner’s
response to a technology shock (details of the social planner’s allocation are found in
Appendix Appendix A.5).
Nominal inertia: Our benchmark calibration of nominal inertia sets the Rotem-
berg price adjustment cost parameter ϕ = 26.34, to match a Calvo probability of no
price change of 0.6, as in (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2006). As sensitivity check, we
take ϕ = 137.19, corresponding to a Calvo parameter of 0.8 (along the lines of (Gali
and Gertler, 1999)) and implying prices are sticky for more than a year; and ϕ = 7.87,
26The varying degrees of labor supply elasticity aﬀect the deterministic steady state, such that new
steady state gap variables emerge. Their diﬀerences are suﬃciently large so that it is not possible to
meaningfully illustrate the impulse responses within the same plots. Figures C.13 - C.15 show the
impulse responses of gap variables as relative to their steady state values.
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corresponding to a much lower level of inertia, equivalent to a Calvo parameter of 0.4
or about 5 months price duration (as found, for example, in (Bils and Klenow, 2004),
(Klenow and Kryvtsov, 2008), (Nakamura and Steinsson, 2008)).
Figure (C.16) plots the impulse responses to the exogenous increase in government
spending. In this case varying the degree of nominal inertia aﬀects the relative bal-
ance between real and nominal adjustment as one would expect, but does not aﬀect the
qualitative responses to government spending shocks - the crowding in of private sector
consumption remains. With lower price adjustment costs (dash-dot lines in the Figure),
we observe much larger ﬂuctuations in inﬂation and correspondingly larger changes in
real interest rates, aimed at stabilizing prices and discouraging over-consumption. This
variation in interest rates is reﬂected in the response of private consumption which gen-
erally ﬂuctuates more than under the benchmark value of nominal inertia, although
there is an imperceptibly smaller rise in the ﬁrst period (due to the much higher interest
rate). Conversely, when nominal inertia is high (dash lines), there is less of an inﬂa-
tion response to the government spending shock, and correspondingly relatively smaller
adjustments in interest rates and consumption.
Finally, Figures (C.17) and (C.18) consider the fully optimal Ramsey policy in the
model with government debt and distortionary taxation and, again, the variation in
the degree of nominal inertia does not overturn the basic analysis of the benchmark
model considered above. Varying the degree of nominal inertia merely changes the
relative magnitude of the responses of real variables versus nominal variables as one
would expect, with greater nominal inertia implying more muted inﬂation changes and
a stronger response in real variables. However, there is a slight change in the initial tax
policy in the face of a positive technology shock, which essentially seeks to enhance the
eﬀects of the initial fall in inﬂation on the eventual steady-state stock of debt.
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Figure C.13: Varying labor supply elasticity. Impulse responses to a +1% government spending shock
with optimal monetary policy and common pricing. Frisch labor supply elasticity equals 1.3 (benchmark
value, solid lines), 0.5 (dash lines), and 4 (dash-dot lines). The inﬂation and interest rate variables are
expressed in annualized terms.
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Figure C.14: Varying labor supply elasticity. Impulse responses to a +1% technology shock with optimal
monetary and ﬁscal policy and common pricing. Frisch labor supply elasticity equals 1.3 (benchmark
value, solid lines), 0.5 (dash lines), and 4 (dash-dot lines). The inﬂation and interest rate variables are
expressed in annualized terms.
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Figure C.15: Varying labor supply elasticity. Impulse responses to a negative markup shock (+1% ηt)
with optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy and common pricing. Frisch labor supply elasticity equals 1.3
(benchmark value, solid lines), 0.5 (dash lines), and 4 (dash-dot lines). The inﬂation and interest rate
variables are expressed in annualized terms.
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Figure C.16: Varying nominal inertia. Impulse responses to a +1% government spending shock with op-
timal monetary policy and common pricing. Rotemberg price adjustment costs: ϕ = 26.34 (benchmark
value, solid lines), ϕ = 137.19 (dash lines), and ϕ = 7.87 (dash-dot lines). The inﬂation and interest
rate variables are expressed in annualized terms.
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Figure C.17: Varying nominal inertia. Impulse responses to a +1% technology shock with optimal mon-
etary and ﬁscal policy and common pricing. Rotemberg price adjustment costs: ϕ = 26.34 (benchmark
value, solid lines), ϕ = 137.19 (dash lines), and ϕ = 7.87 (dash-dot lines). The inﬂation and interest
rate variables are expressed in annualized terms.
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Figure C.18: Varying nominal inertia. Impulse responses to a negative markup shock (+1% ηt) with
optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy and common pricing. Rotemberg price adjustment costs: ϕ = 26.34
(benchmark value, solid lines), ϕ = 137.19 (dash lines), and ϕ = 7.87 (dash-dot lines). The inﬂation
and interest rate variables are expressed in annualized terms.
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